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THE OHIO "BLUE SKY" CASES.

"* * * Shall we indict one man for making a fool
of another! Let him bring his action." Lord Hor,T, C.
J., in Regina v. Jones, (z704), 2 Ld. Raymond, IOIJ.
"The offense that is indictable must be such a one as
affects the public. As if a man uses false weights and
measures, and sells by them to many of his customers.
* * *; so, if a man defrauds another, under false
tokens. For these are deceptions that common care and
prudence are not sufficient to guard against. * * *"
"But here, it is a mere frivate imposition or deception. * * *"
''Therefore (though I "may be sorry for it in the
present case, as circumstance_d), the judgment mu.st be
arrested." Lord MANSFU::r,n, in Rex v. Wheatley
(z76z), 2 Burr. n25.
ancient notion that private £rand lies beyond the domain of
T HEpublic
law did not long survive the statements of it that have
been quoted.1 Our legislation, expressing always the changing moral standards of the people, has directed the sanctions of the
criminal law, step by step, ever against new forms of overreaching
· and imposition. Numerous illustrations might be cited to show the
growing repugnance of the public mind toward frauds and cheats,
and the tendency to recognize them as offenses invoking the restraint
of public action as well as the redress of priv:ate injuries. 2
1 The general statute of England punishing the obtaining of property by false
pretenses was enacted in 1757 (30 Geo. 2, c. 24) repealed and re-enacted in 182?; (7 & 8
Geo. 4 cc. 27, 29).
2 At early common Jaw. the plaintiff might have a capias in process or execution
only when the defendant had committed force (Harbert's Case (1585) 3 Coke, nb);
and later. the ca. sa. was extended by statute so as to be available substantially whenever a fi. fa. might be had; but when the reforms of the first half of the nineteenth
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The reasons for this development of public policy are not difficult to trace or conjecture, and we need not stop to mention them.
It is sufficient to say that they are of such a character as to suggest
most naturally the application of that method of the police power
which has been employed in the Ohio statute sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hallv. Geiger-Jones Company.2 •
This method may be designated as direct prevention. By the use
of some such descriptive term the manner in which the police power
of the state is asserted in this legislation may be distinguished from
the indirect way in which the object of preventing the kind of frauds
at which the act is aimed might have been at least measurably attained by the enactment of penal laws in the ordinary form, punishing the evil acts sought to be repressed after their commission. This
distinction is thought to be important, because it is believed that no
question as to the constitutionality of a law making it a crime lmowingly to sell worthless securities or worthless land located outside
of the state could or would have been seriously raised~ Yet the sole
foundation .for the exercise of the police. power in such form would
have been the prevention of fraud. In the enlightened view of
modem times prevention of public evils is looked upon as the principal object, at least, of the criminal law, especially that part of it
which Cleals with subject matter formerly described as mala prohibita. The prevention aimed at by imposing punishments after the
fact is, however, indirect and consequential; the state is primarily
interested in preventing the evils, rather than in p~ishing the offenders in any vindictive spirit. Therefore, and because the activities engendering the particular wrongs sought to be repressed are
such as at once to suggest and to make easy of application a method
<>f direct prevention, it seems quite natural to find some twenty-six
states enacting "Blue Sky" laws of the same general nature. All
these laws, however they may differ in detail, have in common the
elements of inspection and licensure. That is, all of them interpose
between the business of dealing in certain. things--corporate stocks,
bonds and (in some cases) lands located outside of the state-on
the one hand and the public, on the other hand, as it were a screen,
through which the good, being ascertained to be such, may pass, but
by which the bad may be winnowed out ·and prevented from becoming the means of imposition and fraud.
·
That such a method of what may be termed prophylactic legislation is a natural development will at once appear when it is rememcentury came, they limited process and execution against the body generally to cases
of fraud, substituting this criterion for that set up when the writs were originally
invented.
h 37 Sup. Ct. 217.
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bered that it is really nothing more than the method which has been
privately applied in the conduct of the general business affected by
such regulations. Just as private censorship of motion picture films
preceded public censorship and unquestionably suggested the model
of such legislation as was sustained in Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industrial Commission,8 so the methods of the stock exchanges, applied
in the lisµitg of· securities for sale therein, have become thoroughly
familiar, and may have at least unconsciously suggested the policy
of applying them in the legislation under discussion.'
T)le precise manner in which this method of the police power is·
.· employed in the Ohio "Blue Sky" law may be abstracted as follows:
I. All "dealers" are required to obtain from a "commissioner"
(the superintendent of banks, acting ex officio and through a deputy)
a license, before offering to dispose of. any "securities" in Ohio;
and to file with such "commissioner", before disposing of particular
"securities", certain information with respect thereto.
By an elaborate series of d.efinitions and exceptions, substantial
exemptions from these two requirements are made. For example,
a license is not required from. an owner, not the issuer or underwriter, who disposes of his own property on his own account, otherwise than as a regular business; from a national bank, nor from a
state bank, with certain restrictions as to the latter ; from a trustee
executing his trust, nor a pledgee selling in due course; from one,
not the issuer, who disposes to a licensee or a regular dealer; from
the issuer disposing of its own securities in good faith and at a
.. certain maximum promotion expense, no part of the issue being in
payment for patents, l!ervices, good-will, or property not locate~ in
the state.
The information is not required of a licensee where the securities
offered are sold by a member of a stock exchange at a ma.Ximum
commission of t%, or- are such that their value may be ascertained
from market reports or standard manuals of information; wh~re
the information respecting an issue of securities has been filed by
another licensee ; where there is a disposal for a consideration, in a
single transaction, of five thousand dollars or more; nor where the
securities disposed of were outstanding in the hands of bona fide
purChasers prior to March I, 1914. The term "securities" does -not
include ordinary commercial paper; conveyances -0f real estate; nor
•236
4 "" •

u. s. .230.

• The requirement is not unreasonable or inappropriate.
It extends to the
general market something of the safeguards that arc given to trading upon the exchanges· and stock .boards of the country, safeguards that experience has adopted as
advantageous". Opinion of Mr. Justice McKcnna, in the principal case.
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where not judicially declared invalid and there is no default in payment, mortgage bonds and notes (but othenvise as to corporate
bonds more than 50% of an issue of which is not included in a sale
to one purchaser) ; securities the issuance of which has been au.,.
thorized by the state public utilities commission; nor stocks of banks,
etc., subject to national or state examination and supervision.
2. An issuer ~r undenvriter of securities must, before offering
to dispose of them for the purpose of organization or promotion, or
flotation after organization, secure from the "Commissioner" (who,
in cases of insurance companies, is for this purpose the superintendent cif insurance), a "certificate" based upon certain information.
But this requirement is greatly limited in the scope of its application
by exceptions, among which are included, generally, the same kinds
of cases excepted from the requirement of information exacted from
a licensee, and above abstracted, and in addition, the following:
a. Where the underwriter has actually purchased the issue for
not less than ninety per cent. of the price at which he offers to sell
the securities thereof;
b. · Where the securities are those of a common carrier;
c. Where the securities are those of a domestic. corporation engaged principally in manufacturing, transportation, coal mining or
quarrying, and at least a. part of the property on which they are
predicated is located in the state ;
d. Where the securities are those of a real estate company, all of
whose property on which they are predicated is located in the state.
3. Both licensure and certification are required as conditions of
dealing in real estate not located in Ohio (there being here, also
certain exceptions, which it is not necessary to observe.)
4. The applicant for license must furnish to the commissioner
certain information about his business, and fi1e an irrevocable consent to be sued in any action arising out of the fraudulent disposal
of securities, in the courts of Franklin County, Ohio, and to accept
notice by registered mail as a substitute for personal service of
summons.
Notice of the application must be published in a newspaper circu·
latillg in the place where tpe business is to be carried on. The application may not be acted on until the expiration of one week, but
must be acted on within twenty days after proof of publication.
Pending final disposition of an application, the "commissioner" may
issue a temporary or provisional license. Licenses must be renewed
annually, as of the first day of January. Additional licensure is required for each agent of the principal licensee.
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The eondition of licensure is described as follows: "If the 'commissioner' be satisfied of the good repute in business of such applicant and * * * agents".
Revocation of licenses, and refusal to renew them, is authorized
upon the following alternative conditions to be ascertained by the
"commissioner".
a. That the licensee is of bad business repute;
b. That he has violated the act;
c. That he is engaged, or is about to engage, under favor of the
license, in illegitimate business or in fraudulent transactions.
Revocation of a license prevents re-licensure of the dealer for a
period of six months: Five days' notice of revocation, refusal to
grant, or refusal to renew, must be given by the "commissioner" to
the applicant or licensee, specifying the reasons for the intended
action. Within thirty days from the date of such action the licensee
or applicant may appeal to the Common Pleas Court of Franklin
· C9uilty for a reversal of the action complained of. The commissioner's answer must be filed within eight days, and must set up the
groJltlds of his action previously assigned in the notice, and others
which may subsequently be discovered. AI_l immediate hearing may·
be secured. The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, but the
judgment of the court is final as to the "commissionert', though not
(apparently) as to the plaintiff.
5. ,Similar procedure in the issuance of the "certificate'.' which
has been des'cribed is provided for in the act. The condition of
issuance is expressed as follows :
"If it shall appear that the law h~s been complied with and that
the business of the applicant is not fraudulently conducted, and that
the proposed disposal of such securities is not on unfair terms, and
that the issuer, or vendor is solvent." ·
The "commissioner" must act "within a reasonable time". He
may revoke a certificate "when he has reason to believe that the business of the holder thereof is being fraudulently conducted, or that
· such securities or other property are being disposed of upon grossly
unfair terms, or that the issuer of the securities is insolvent". The
applicant has the same right to judicial review in the case of the
certificate as is afforded to the applicant for license.
The act provides, of course, a schedule of fees, and imposes upon
applicants certain expenses.5
•The legislation above abstracted may be found in 103 Ohio Laws 743, 104 Ohio
Laws no, and 106 Ohio Laws 363. (See supplement to Page & Adams' General Code
of Ohio, H 6373-1, 6373·2+
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As has been suggested, the end of such legislation as this-the prevention of certain easily perpetrated frauds-is certainly within the
police power !Jf the state. Obviously, the means chosen for its .accomplishment afford the only point of attack available to those who
would assail its validity on constitutional grounds. That is to say,__ _
the particular method of the police power, and not its substantive
extent, is all that may be seriously called in question under our constitution.
From the viewpoint of the Supreme Court of the United States
the fact,. hereinbefore mentioned, that over half the states of the
Union had chosen to apply this method could not have been without
its weight.6 Nor would that court be wholly unmindful of the significance of the fact that the Ohio law had been enacted under the
direct sanction and authority of a constitutional amendment adopted
by the electors of Ohio in 1912.7
Neither of these_ considerations are explicitly mentioned by Mr.
Justice McKsNNA in his opinion. They arc: referred to here, hc.wever, because of the attitude evinced by some of the special District
Courts toward the general policy of such legislation.
No fewer than six adverse decisions respecting the constitutionality of "Blue Sky" laws of various states had been rendered by such
special District Courts prior to the decision of the Supreme Court
in the principal case.8 In these decisions, so far as reported, there
is evinced what is believed to be a lamentable lack of appreciation
of the weight of the evidence of public conviction as to the necessity
for adopting the method under examination. All of them ignore this
evidence, and assume to decide this fundamental question for themselves, some in one way, some in the other.9
•See Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 421>, .;zx; Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 1041 III; German·Alliance Ins. Co. v, Lewis, 233
U. S. 389, 412, etc.
~ "* • • Corporations may be classified and there may be conferred upon proper
• • • officers such supervisory powers over their organization, business and issue and
sale of stocks and securities and over the business and sale of the stocks and securities
of foreign corporations and joint stock companies in this state, as may be prescribed
by law. • • ... (Article XIII, §:z, Ohio Constitution, as amended September 3, 1912).
•Alabama & N. O. Transp. Co. v. -Doyle, 210 Fed. 173 (The first Michigan act) ;
'Villiam R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 Fed. 357 (the Iowa law); Bracey v. Darst, 218
Fed. 482 (the West Virginia act); N. W. Halsey & Co. v. Merrick, 228 Fed. Sos. (the
second Michigan act); Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 231> Fed. 233 (the Ohio law); and
the unreported decree in Sioux Falls Stockyards Co. v. Caldwell (the South Dakota
law; see 230 Fed. 236).
•
9 "When we • • • recall that the prohibition applies to a private business, the
question at once presents itself whether frauds and opportunities for fraud sufficiently
characterize the business to justify its entire prolu'bition save under drastic restrictions.
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact, which all men know, that, as compared with the
total dealings in securities covered and contingently prohibited by this act, those which
may fairly be suspected to be of a fraudulent character are a very trilling portion": Per
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It is scarcely to be expected that any two processes of legal reasoning proceeding from viewpoints as divergent as these would end in
accord. All these courts were dealing with the police ·power, which,
being the exercise of society's right of self-defense, is always theoretically limited.by the rule of necessity, and by no other rule. The
significant thing about the decisions on both sides, is that the premises are in ev.ery instance assumptions of facts "which all men !mow",
to quote from the opinion in the first Michigan case. It is obvious
curiam, Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle, supra, citing People v. Circuit Judge, 124 Mich.
664, 667.

"* • • In one sense we think this evil has been fully provided for. So far as we
know, the states uniformly have criminal statutes against the procurement of money•
• • • under • • * false prefenses • • • and the civil right of the victim • • • to recover back the money • • • so secured is universally upheld and enforced. In another
sense some of the states may have failed to meet their full obligation to the citizenship
of the whole country, in that they have indiscriminately granted charters to corporations
without safeguarding its citizenship • * • from • • • fraudulent • • • organizations, forgetting perhaps the homely maxim that 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure'." Dayton, D. J., in Bracey v. Darst.
,
(The learned judge seems to appreciate the appropriateness of prevention, but would
apparently limit it to such restrictions as may operate upon the issuing corporation itself
in the state of its origin. The intimation that the statutes against obtaining property
by false pretenses constitute "full provision" for the ~ brings out the issue quite
squarely). ·
·
• Contrast these statements with the following:
"The statute here involved was intended to prevent, or at least check, one of the
most generally recognized and harmful evils of economic life. With increasing facilitica
of communication ~ sorta of visionary schemes are imposed upon the public by setling
stocks, bonds and other papers • • • calling for returns on the investment. Nothing
· seems plainer than the right of the legislature under the police po;wer to provide by
statute a reasonable method of having these ·schemes examined into by. some public
authority and requiring those who would scll to the public securities based on them to
make a showing of good faith, solvency, and a reasonable chance of return on the in-'
vestment''. Woods, C. J., dissenting, in Bracey v. Darst, p. 497, referring at page 498,
to railway regulation statutes, inspection laws, insurance company regulations, and the
like, with decisions thereunder.
"* • • These instances have been so frequent that the United States Post• Office
Department has estimated that the people of this country have been losing annually
more than one hundred millions of dollars by speculative schemes which have no more
substantial basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'. • • • This state has sought to protect
'its people, not by forbidding such tr~ctions but by the very reasonable requirement
that when parties • * • propose to do business in our borders, they must submit their
statement of assets and the nature of their business to the insurance commissioner''.
State v. Agey (N. C., 1916) 88 S. E. 727: the reference may be to the report of the
postmaster general, 1913, p. 97; same, 1914, P· go.
"Experience has demonstrated the fact that some of the grossest frauds have been
perpetrated. on the public by investment companies. • • * Such regulations are proper
=d wholesome. • • • The national courts • • • are only clothed with jurisdiction
to prosecute those who • • • make use of the mails, and only after the commission of
the offense. • • • The state alone can enact laws to prevent the commission of those
crimes. Legislation to prevent crime is of greater benefit to society than the punishment of the offender after the crime has been committed and innocent persons have
"been made to suffer." Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217 Fed. 904-919, where a bill for
injunction against the enforcement of the Arkansas "Blue Sky" law was dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds.
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that the real disagreement among the lower courts was as to the
relative prevalence of fraudulent dealings in "securities" as compared with the total volume of business of the same general character, which would necessarily be affected by such legislation; or, at
the least, as to the practical necessity of the method of prevention.
taking the whole field of business into consideration. These mooted
points would seem to be facts, and it appears that they were actually
treated as such, and that cognizance of them was taken through
"judicial notice."
The somewhat ludicrous diversity of the results of judici~l notice
manifested in these opinions tends to prove the fallacy of making
the validity of legislation depend upon facts thus assumed. It is respectfully submitted that, however admissible these facts might be
if clearly established, it is out of place for the judiciary to take unassisted judicial notice of them either contrary to the expressed
legislative conviction or in support of it.10 The courts have always
done lip-service to a supposed presumption of constitutionality. :f.ut
only of late has the Supreme Court of tl).e United States led the
way to a substantial observance of the rule. The question is not
one of power, but one of evidence; and the judgment of the legislature-especially of twenty-six legislatures-is, after all reservations
are made, strqng evidence of a relevant character. It has been suggested, and is no doubt true; that the changing attitude of the courts
evidences a gradual shifting from an individualistic political philosophy to one Gf emphasis upon social and community interests.11
In view of the unsatisfactory approach of all the lower courts
toward the solution of the questions raised under the various "Blue ·
Sky" laws, it is refreshing to note the attitude of the Su:{lreme Court
in this respect, as disclosed by the follo\ving extracts from Mr. Justice McKENNA's opinion.

"* * * The existence of evil is indi<;ated, and a belief of
its detriment; and we shall not pause to do more than state
that the preventi'on of deception is within the competency of
government and that the appreciation of the consequences of
it is not open for our review.12
'° "It is not one of the least problems of the sociological jurist to discover a rational
mode of advising the court of facts of which it is supposed to take judicial notice."
Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function", 7 Pub. Am. Soc. Soc'y., 148, 161. The
problem would seem not to be limited to the ascertainment of what might be termed
sociological facts in the strictest sense, but to exist with respect to all facts. which
might be the predicates of police legislation.
11 See "Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," by Felix Frankfurter.
29 Harv. Law Rev.
12 Citing the Trading Stamp Cases, 240 U. S. 342, 391.
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"* * * It is asserted that the 'normal investment business
of the country' and its 'individual transactions' are not subject to 'executive control', the broad contention being made
that as such business cannot be prohibited it cannot be regulated. This, indeed, is the basic principles of the opposition
to the act. * * *
"As broadly made, we cannot assent to these propositions.
The reason and extent of the law we have indicated and the
control to which individual transactions are subjected, and
we think both are within the competency of the state. * * *
"* * * Inconvenience may be caused by supervision and
surveillance, but this must yield to the public welfare ; and
against counsel's alarm of consequences, we set the judgment
of the State."
Not one word here as to the sacredness of a so-called "private
business", nor as to the actual prevalence of fraud in the business,
or lack of it.
In this connection it is to be observed that the exemptions in the
Ohio law are of such character and extent as to remove all serious
claim that it unnecessarily burdens business that is clearly legitimate.
What remains subject to inspection and licensure is that in which the
possibility of fraud 'lurks, and concerning which it would seem reasonable for the state to exercise preventive precautions if such
measures were possible in any case. The strictures of the District
Court upon the first Michigan statute in this respect a statute could
not have been: applied to the Ohio law.
This very effort to mitigate the effect of the Ohio law with respect to the business as a whole was laid hold of by SATER, D. ]-:, of
the Ohio District Court, as a weapon of attack on the ground of
aenial of equal protection of the law.13. If the law includes all, it
would seem that it is an unreasonable restraint; if it excludes those
who in the opinion of the legislature do not stand in need of regulation, at least to an extent equal to that required respecting others,
it is an unreasonable classification.
Of course, in the light of the many recent cases on the subject of
reasonable classification, the Supreme Court brushed this point aside
with what amounts to a show of righteous iinpatience.u
The attempt of the law's assailants to overthrow it by the dilemma
which has been described having failed, they had recourse, as is
See 230 Fed. 245.
••"It is enough to say they are within the power of classification which a state has."
(Citing and quoting from Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160).
It is suggested that the final word on this subject is expressed· in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. (Per Mr. Justice Vandevanter).
11
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usual in such cases, to certain other main objections, as wen ·as to
several of a more detailed character, which latter can not be dealt
with here. The remaining principal points of attack were as follows :
1. That the standards of licensure and inspection are too vaguely
set up in the law, thus leaving to the executive officers charged with
their application such latitud.e of discretion and individual judgment
as to amount to the familiar "arbitrary power".
2. That no "regulation" of a "purely private business", as distinguished from one "charged with a public interest" is permissible
at all under the police power; and that the act embodies such a
regulation.
3. That the act directly burdens interstate commerce.
After Gundling v. Chicago,1 5 with the citation of which Mr. Justice McKENNA answered the first objection, it seems inexplicable
that this point should have appeared as even plausible. Indeed, the
cognate question of delegation of legislative power based upon the
same view of the powers of the "commissioner" had been settled as
to the Ohio constitution by both state and federal courts.16 Moreover, the provision for judicial review would seem to obviate any
possible criticism on this ground.
The second objection was not even mentioned by Mr. Justice
McKENNA. At least two of the District Courts had made much of
this point. Yet upo~ reflection it is believed that it will appear that
the contention is wholly without merit, and that the Supreme Court
rightly ignored it. The curious m~sapprehension that the police
power.does not extend to so-called "private business" but is limited
to such as may be "charged with a public interest" seems ~o have
been suggested to the Michigan District Court11 by the fallacious
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Berrien Cir-.
cuit Judge,18 and is adopted seemingly without reservation by all the
concurring district courts, SATER, D. J., of the Ohio court, adding
only the citation of Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.19
It may be admitted that there are some State decisions, even of
recent date, that seem to embody this singular idea. But surely no
support is found for it in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States. As Mr. Justice McKENNA puts it in his
opinion:
.. 177

u. s.

183.

u See Board of Health v. Greenville, 86 Oh. St.
trial Commission, 236 U. S. 230.
1' See 210 Fed. 18o.
11
124 Mich. 664, 667.
1t III U. S. 746.

I ;

Mutual Film Co• ..,.; Ohio Indus·
.
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"That power [the police power of a State], we have said,
is the least !imitable of the exercises of government. Sligh
v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. We get no accurate idea of its
limitations by opposing to it the declarations of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * Nob le State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U. S. 104, IIO.
"* * * All of these rights [of liberty and property] may
be regulated. Such are the declarations of the cases, become
platitudes by frequent repetition and many instances of application".
As to the effect of. the law as a regulatipn of interstate commerce, the Michigan District Court in Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle,20
had correctly assumed "that this inquiry, whether the burden is
'direct', is only another form of the question whether the act is
within the police power". That is fo say excepting, mainly, the very
transportation of interstate commerce, the regulation of which lies
within the exclusive field of congressional action, the various attributes of that commerce are subject to the application of police
measures, which the States may adopt and enforce unless and until
·congress has occupied the field. There being no claim that Congress
had so acted, nor that transportation, as such, was directly affected
by the law before it, the only question remaining for the decision of
the District Court was as to whether or not the law was a proper
exercise of the police power. The Michigan court having already
taken judicial notice of facts upon which the unreasonableness of the
la:w, as a police measure, were necessarily predicated, the interstate
commerce question was, of course, not even raised.
.
The other District Courts, however, failed to appreciate this point,
and seemed to conceive of the interstate commerce question as
wholly independent of the question as to the propriety Qf the provisions of the respective laws as police measures, though some of
them were disposed to admit, with the Michigan court, that if sustainable as inspection laws, they might be upheld. Thus, in William
R. Compton Co. v. Allen,21 a narrow view of what constitutes an
"inspection", based upon People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,22 was taken, the duty of the State official charged with the
administration of the particular "Blue Sky" law before the court was
held not to fall within the definition of the term, and the conclusion
that the requirements of the law cQnstituted therefore a direct burden
on interstate commerce was immediately reached. In Bracey v.
"210 Fed. 173, at p. r8<J..
21 216 Fed. 537.
:D 107
59.

u. s.
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Darst28 the only feature of the question discussed at all is the point
that "stocks, bonds, debentures and other securities are subjectmatters of interstate commerce", but the decision is perhaps µot
open to criticism here, for it would seem that if, as DAYTON, D. J.,
had held, the action for fraud, the punishment for obtaining property by false pretenses, and the safeguarding of incorporation by
the State of origin constitute ample prevention of the evils aimed at
by the "Blue Sky" laws, inspection and licensure, as provided for in
such laws, would be unnecessary and unreasonable as police meas. ures, quite apart from their effect on interstate commerce.
The Ohio District Court also devoted a considerable portion of
its opinion to establishing that stocks and bonds are subjects of
commerce (a question which, it is believed, is not free from doubt).
SATER, D. J., acknowledged the validity of police regulation "incidentally" affecting interstate commerce, but upon the authority of
International Te.xt Book Co. v. Pigg,2 ' Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 2 s
and Cmtcher v. Kentucky, 26 held the effect of the Ohio law to ht a
"direct" burden thereon.
Some discrimination is necessary here. It has been pointed out
that the Ohio law, in common with most, if not all, of the other
"Blue Sky" laws, interposes two agencies of prevention, viz: licensure of the dealer, and inspection or certification of the thing dealt
in. The Michigan, Iowa arid West Virginia decisions seem to disregard the license feature, and to predicate the effect upon interstate
commerce of the legislation under review upon the other.preventive
meastJre, weighing it as a proper means of "inspection". The Ohio
court, ·on the other hand, placing little, if any, stress upon the inspection feature, considered the interstate commerce question as
made by the requirement of license. The one requirement, it will
be observed, operates in a sense upon the thing sold, or upon the
particular sale, to be consummated within the State; the other operates rather upon the business as a whole.
The disposition of these two distinct questions by the Supreme
Court is believed to be the least satisfactory part of Mr. Justice
McKENNA'S opinion. He says~
"The provisions of the law * * * apply to dispositions of
securities within the State, and while information of those
issued in the States and foreign countries is required to be
filed * * * they are only affected by the requirement of a
'"218 Fed. 482.
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license of one who deals in them within the State. Upon
their transportation into the State there is no impedimentno regulation of them or interference with them after they
get them. There is the exaction only that he who disposes of
them there shall be licensed to do so and this only that they
may not appear in false character and impose an appearance
of a value which they may not possess-and this certainly is
only an indirect burden upon them as objects of interstate
commerce, if they may be regarded as such. It is a: pblice
regulation strictly, not affecting them until there is an attempt
to make disposition of them within the State. To give them
more immunity than this is to give them more immunity than
more tangible articles are given, they having no exemption
from regulations the purpose of which is to prevent fraud or
deception. Such regulations affect interstate commerce in
them only incidentally. Hat ch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152;
Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405; Engel v.
O'Malley, 219 U. $. 128; Brodna~ v. Missouri, Id. 285;
Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210; Savage v. Jones,
225 U. S. 501; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, Id. 540;
Trading Stamp Cases, supra. With these eases International
Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Buck Stove & Range Co. v.
Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, and the Lottery Cases, 88 U. S. 321,
are not in discordance.
We might, indeed, ask, When do the designated securities
cease migration in interstate commerce and settle to the
jurisdiction of the State? Material things, choses in possession, pass out of interstate commerce when they emerge from
the original package. Do choses in action have a longer immunity? It is to be remembered that though they may differ
in manner of transfer, they are in the same form in the hands
of the purchaser as they are in the hands of the seller, and
in the hands of both as they are brought into the
State. We ask again, Do they never pass out of interstate
commerce? Have they always the freedom of the State? Is
there no point of time at which the State can expose the evil
that they may mask? Is anything more necessary for the
supremacy of the national power than that they be kept free
when in actual transportation, subjected to the jurisdiction of
the State only when they are attempted to be sold to the individual purchaser? The questions are pertinent, the answers to them, one way or the other, of consequence; but we
may pass them for regarding the securities as stiU in inter-
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state commerce after their transportation to the State is ended and they have reached the hands of dealers in them, their
interstate character is only incidentally affected by the
statute."
·
A confusion of thought seems apparent- here. Yet the authorities
cited seem to answer both of the two distinct questions which the
opinion fails. to discuss as such.
As to the inspection feature, it is submitted that the lower courts.
· were wrong; and that the Supreme Court was right in holding, at
least inferentially, that in so far as bringing stocks and bonds into
a State for sale therein might be regarded as interstate commerce,
an inquiry by the State into their intrinsic value in order to protect
purchasers is an "inspection". It does not follow that because a
given kind of inquiry may transcend the limits of an inspection when
directed toward s9mething tangible and capable of ocular appraisement or mechanical test, the same kind of inquiry is more than an
inspection when its object is to ascertain the essential attnbutes of
an intangible thing. Mr. Justice McKENNA well says, on
point,
that
'
"The principle applies as well to securities as to material
products, the provisions of the law necessarily varying 'vith
the objects."

this

The greatest difficulty in the case is encountered when the consideration of the question made by the license feature of the· law is
reached. The Supreme Court seems to have felt this difficulty, if
we may infer as much from the somewhat summary manner in which
Mr. Justice McKENNA disposes of International Text Book Co. v.
Pigg, Buck Stove &.Range Co. v. Vickers, and the· Lottery Cases,
and. the character of the argument in the last paragraph of his
opinion, which has been quoted. Yet it seems that the result arrived at by the court may be justified in either of two wayf>, in spite
of the failure of the opinion to discuss the point fully.
The problem may be stated thus: In the Lottery Cases the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce was held to be
subject to federal control, against the objection that they constituted
mere choses in action. Therefore, it would seem that shares of stock
and bonds, which may be assimilated to lottery tickets in respect of
their essential character, must be held to be subjects of interstate
commerce. In the Pigg and Vickers cases a State law, exacting a
license from a foreign corporation as a condition of the transaction
of interstate commerce business within the State, was held to be
unconstitutional. The business thus regarded as interstate and com-
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mercial in character consisted of sending subjects of commerce
(books, letters of instruction, and manufactured articles) into the
State in pursuance of contracts calling for such transportation and
delivery, regardless of where the contracts were made. Assuming
that the Ohio law requires a license as a condition precedent to the
sale, within the State, by a dealer to a purchaser,. of a bond or .a
share of stock, the paper or certificate for which may at the time be
in another State, so that interstate transportation of it is required to
'complete delivery and discharge the contract, why is the law not unconstitutional within the principles of these decisions?
Mr. Justice McKsNNA apparently answers this question by assuming that the law applies only to the sale or barter of things already in
the State, so that the "original package" rule is the only one the
application of which is involved. In other words, he treats the requirement of the law as a "peddlers" license, as in Emert v. l.-!issouri,21 instead of in partial application, at least, a "drummer's"
license, as in Robbins v. Shelby Co.28 The learned Justice appears to
have overlooked the wide meaning of the term "dispose of" as defined in the act.29 Yet it is believed that, even regarded as a "drummer's license" the law, in this· r-espect, is valid; first, because the
license feature of the law is merely a means of enforcing more
effectually the inspection feature of it, and may be sustained as such
if, as contended, the main purpose embodied in the latter may stand;
and second, because the hypothetical transaction above described and
likened to the activity of a "drummer" is not interstate commerce
at all.
The first point was seemingly admitted by the Michigan District
Court, which held that the first Michigan act could not be sustained
as a licensing law because the license in reality conferred no ultimat~
benefit or privilege upon the investment company or dealer, in that
each issue of securities or item of business would be subject to
scrutiny notwithstanding the licensure of the company or dealer.
Accordingly it was held by that court that the law must stand or
fall as an inspection measure, the license feature being incidental.80
This view of the relation of the license provision to the inspection
feature of a law of the general character under discussion is believed to be correct. Reasonable inspection fees might have been
exacted from the "dealer" or the "issuer" for each "security" the
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disposal of which within the State might be contemplated.31 The
legislation under review substitutes the one license fee for all the
inspection fees that might have been provided, save in the limited
class of cases in which a "certificate" is required. On the other
hand, as all the transactions, even the one assumed for the purpose
of making a case like that of the "drummer" are subject to inspection, for the reasons stated, it is impossible to conceive of a "disposal" within the State that is npt.subject to the State's police power.
Surely a State may impose a license on reasonable terms as a condition of transacting a business every ·feature or possible item of
which is subject to its control; and if the mere fact that a possible
item may be interstate and commercial in character is not enough to
withdraw it from the State's control for the main purpose, it is clear
that the dealer may not assert an unqualified right to transact it and
a corresponding immunity from licensure. The Pigg and Vickers
cases were decided upon the express ground that the activity licensed
was commerce which the State cotild not by its legislation contro1.32
Hence they are not opposed to the result reached.
While the question has perhaps never been presented in a manner
precisely similar to that in which it is raised by the "Blue Sky" laws,
there are instances in which State regulations in the form of licenses
have been upheld though applicable to interstate commerce transactions, where, for some distinct reason, the transaction, though interstate, was subject to State control until Congress should act. 33
The second point, above suggested, is valid for either of two distinct reasons. First, it is at least open to suspicion that the kinds of
dealings in stocks and bonds which, after all the exemptions which
the Ohio law affords are taken away; remain subject to licensure,
are not "disposals" of particular shares or certificates, at all. Rather,
it is believed that it is a fact that the true contract of "disposal" is
an agreement on the part of the "dealer" to "dispose of" so many
shares of stock, or so many bonds, of a given corporation, for example, the seller being at liberty to acquire them for delivery where
he will, so far .as the actual requirements of the contract are concerned. If this is true, then the case comes squarely within Ware
~Leland v. Mobile County,3' cited by Mr. Justice McKsNNA. In
other words, on this· assumption the statute does not affect interstate
commerce at all.
n Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina,
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In the second place, it seems possible to demonstrate that selling
shares of stock or bonds can never constitute interstate commerce.
To be sure, the act of transporting the certificates or other papers
from one State to another is interstate commerce, because all transportation is commerce. For this postulate the Lottery Cases8 5 are
authority. But it is submitted that, under the Lottery Cases, the
act of transporting insurance policies from one State to another is
likewise interstate commerce; whereas it is now perfectly well settled
that making a contract of insurance is not a commercial act, though
naturally prece_ded by interstate correspondence and followed by the
interstate shipment of the policy.86 This being so, it is further submitted that a sale or contract within a State is not an interstate commerce transaction if the thing sold or contracted for is not itself
to be transported from one State to another in discharge of the contract of sale, and if the only interstate transportation involved is that
of some mere written memorandum, muniment of title, certificate
of relationship or evidence of a chose in action. The adjudicated
cases appear to have drawn the line here.87 However valuable intrinsically, a certificate of stock may be, and to whatever extent it
may be regarded as distinct property for the purposes of larceny and
execution, it is not the very thing sold or dealt in, but merely evidence of it. In the Lottery Cases themselves, Mr. Justice li.ARLAN,
delivering the majority opinion,88 asserts that "A State * * * may
forbid all sales of lottery tickets within jts limits" and denies the
incompatibility of such power with that of Congress to forbid the
transportation of the tickets.
The lower federal courts were frankly puzzled about the relation
between the Lottery Cases and Paul v. Virginia and its companfons.
The above stated hypothesis seems to reconcile them, and to furnish
a rule by which the decision in the ptjncipal case may be further
supported.
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